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ABSTRACT 
 
Network technology has experienced explosive growth in the past two decades. 
The vast connectivity of networks all over the world poses monumental risks. The 
generally accepted philosophy in the security world is that no system or network is 
completely secure [1] which makes network security a critical concern. The work done in 
this thesis focuses on Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS) where legitimate 
users are prevented from accessing network services. Although a lot of research has been 
done in this field, these attacks remain one of the most common threats affecting network 
performance.   
 One defense against DDoS attacks is to make attacks infeasible for an attacker, 
by increasing either the amount of attack traffic needed to disable a link or the number of 
attackers needed to disable the network.  
Theoretical work has been done previously which focused on quantifying the 
attack traffic required to disable a set of mincut arcs in a network. In this thesis, we 
experimentally verify the validity of the analysis performed by running simulations using 
the SSFNet network simulator.  A Distributed Denial of Service attack is simulated by 
flooding the mincut arcs in the network. From the results, we analyze  
- The minimum number of zombie processors (attack sources) required to 
disable a  set of arcs 
- The minimum attack traffic volume required to disable the arcs. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
As computer systems have evolved into today’s complex, enterprise-wide, 
solutions, the security risks and protective measures have also become complex [2]. 
Maintaining the security of a system involves maintaining confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity, non-repudiation, access control and availability [3]. However, the concept of 
complete security is an illusion [4]. Almost anyone can reach out to any network which 
implies that anyone can reach in [5].  
The lack of authentication means an attacker can create a fake identity, and send 
malicious traffic. A Denial of Service (DoS) attack blocks a service for legitimate users 
and is perpetrated by causing a victim to receive malicious traffic and suffer damage as a 
consequence [6]. The attack can be launched in multiple forms. The attack could exploit 
software vulnerabilities of a target thereby crashing the system, or use massive volumes 
of malicious traffic to consume key resources thus rendering it unavailable to legitimate 
users, or simply send a few malformed packets to confuse an application or a protocol on 
the victim machine and force it to freeze or reboot [6]. While it is possible to patch the 
known vulnerabilities in a system to avoid an attack, it is difficult to prevent the second 
and third form of attacks. The targets are vulnerable simply because they are connected to 
the Internet. When the traffic of a DoS attack comes from multiple sources, then it is 
called as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack [7].  
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In today’s world, botnets are a major source of DDoS problems. Since botnets 
usually involve computers from many countries, tracking an attack becomes more 
difficult. Statistics show that about half of the botnets tracked by Arbor networks 
performed DDoS attacks [8]. A DDoS can have a sustained upload bandwidth of 40 Kb/s 
as an average from each bot. A relatively small botnet can overwhelm most companies, 
and a large botnet might be able to take out a fair –sized ISP [9].  
1.1 Motivation 
 In the late 1990’s the world was not dependent on the Internet as it is now. The 
Internet was still limited to research and educational communities. Hence not much 
attention was paid to Internet security. Today, the traditional role of the Internet has 
changed. Internet is used for banking, bill payments, tax payments, booking travel 
reservations, online shopping. It is used by Governments to share information with the 
world, by researchers as a medium for disseminating their research discoveries rapidly 
and for establishing worldwide connectivity [7]. Unfortunately, the growth in the Internet 
has increased the number of attacks on the Internet.  Figure 1.1 shows a graph of the 
number of security incidents reported in the past. 
The recent attacks on popular websites like Facebook and Twitter are an example of the 
rising number of DDoS attacks. One of the major problems with Distributed Denial of 
Service attacks is the difficulty to detect the source of the attack because of the many 
components involved.  Instead of waiting for an enemy to attack, it is better to use 
defenses to protect networks or make the networks immune to attacks [11]. 
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Figure 1.1: The number of Internet security incidents reported from 1988 to 2003 
(Data collected from [10]) 
1.2 Approach 
 The work done in [11] studies the dynamics of DDoS attacks. The attacker places 
“zombie” processes on the network that consume network bandwidth. The attacker then 
attempts to break the legitimate communications links. The legitimate application 
reconfigures its network to re-establish communications. The authors analyze this board 
game using the theory of surreal numbers [12]. The authors also quantify the number of 
zombies and the amount of zombie traffic that an attacker needs to disable a distributed 
application. We perform simulations to verify if the analysis corresponds to reality. The 
simulations are performed for large scale complex networks which are generated 
automatically using Python scripting. We observe from the results that the legitimate 
4 
 
traffic is reduced to a significant amount when the attack traffic is increased beyond the 
threshold value calculated by the formula. 
1.3 Defense Mechanisms 
The DDoS defense mechanisms are classified as being reactive and preventive. In 
reactive measures, the attack sources are identified and are prevented from continuing the 
attack. The preventive measures focus on eliminating the possibility of performing a 
DDoS attack. Before concluding that a denial of service attack is under progress, it is 
necessary to identify and separate DoS attacks from flash events. This is discussed in 
more detail in the Chapter on DDoS countermeasures.  
In this thesis, we provide a countermeasure when an enterprise network wants to maintain 
communications even though an opponent launches a DDoS attack. We solve this 
problem using a game theoretical approach which is explained in further detail in the 
chapter on Bandwidth Limited Co-ordination of games. 
1.4 Game Theory based coordination 
We look at scenarios when the legitimate application has a set of networks 
connected by bandwidth limited communication links. The application coordinates 
amongst its networks by sending only the most important information. If there are 
multiple messages, then it becomes necessary to prioritize the messages and send the one 
which is the most consistent with the team goal. We study four different strategies to 
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make this decision – Maximin, Maximax, Central values and Hotstrat and conclude that 
the Hotstrat strategy gives the best results. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a background on 
Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Chapter 3 gives a brief overview of the SSFNet 
simulator and the implementations of the protocols used. It also explains the simulation 
scenario used for the simulations and explains some simulation scenarios. Chapter 4 
details the steps involved in setting up and automating the simulation generation process 
for large scale networks. Chapter 5 explains the simulation scenario and the results 
obtained. Chapter 6 focuses on the countermeasures used for DDoS attacks and a 
summary of the work done. Chapter 7 explains our approach to mitigation using the 
principles of combinatorial game theory. We conclude the thesis with Chapter 8 
presenting our conclusions and future directions for research.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND ON DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS 
 
In a denial of service attack, an attacker deliberately consumes resources making 
them unavailable to legitimate users. One common denial of service attack is the 
‘flooding attack’. Typically, to access a website, a request is sent to the website’s server. 
Since there is an upper limit on the number of requests that a server can process, the 
request is rejected if this limit is exceeded.  In a flooding attack, the attacker floods the 
website’s server with a large number of requests thus preventing legitimate users from 
accessing information or services [13]. Similarly, for a free mailing service, there is a 
specific disk quota assigned to an email account. The quota limits the amount of data that 
a user can store in his account at any point of time. If an attacker sends a large amount of 
data to the email account, it might prevent the user from receiving legitimate emails. This 
is a practical example of a Denial of Service attack. 
In a Distributed Denial of Service attack, multiple machines launch the attack. 
The attack thus has a distributed nature. The attacker can make use of the security 
vulnerabilities of a system to launch the attack. There is a high probability that the 
machine used to launch the attack is unaware that it is participating in the attack.  
Sometimes, it becomes difficult to distinguish a distributed denial of service from 
normal network activity. At other times, there might be some indications that an attack is 
under progress.  
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The single attacker who coordinates the attack is called the Master. The Master 
coordinates multiple hijacked systems. These hijacked systems are called zombies. Figure 
2.1 shows the different components of a DDoS attack. 
  
 
Figure 2.1: DDoS Attack 
(Data taken from [11]) 
 
DDoS attacks are considered more effective and complicated than their DoS 
counterparts because the attack can be performed from multiple sites simultaneously and 
the task of detecting the attacker becomes almost impossible. The next section discusses 
some of the commonly used methods of Denial of Service attacks.  
Network 
Infrastructure 
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2.1 Common Denial of Service Attacks 
2.1.1 Smurf attack 
In a Smurf attack, the attacker sends a large number of ICMP echo requests to a 
set of IP broadcast addresses. All the echo requests have a spoofed source IP address of 
the intended victim. On receiving the echo requests, most of the hosts will respond to the 
request with an echo reply. This increases the flooding traffic by the number of hosts 
responding.  
2.1.2 SYN Flood attack  
This attack exploits the standard TCP three-way handshake that is initiated before 
a TCP transmission. The handshake consists of a three packet exchange sent by client to 
the server. The server upon receiving the initial SYN from the client responds with a 
SYN/ACK packet and waits for the client to send a final ACK. If the client sends a huge 
number of SYNs without sending their corresponding ACKs, then the server keeps 
waiting for the non-existent ACKs making it impossible for the server to serve other 
incoming connections. 
2.1.3 UDP Flood attack 
Here the attacker uses the UDP echo and character generator service. Forged UDP 
packets are used to connect the echo service on one machine to the character generator 
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service on another machine. The two services consume a lot of network bandwidth as 
they exchange characters between themselves. [13] 
Some variations of Distributed Denial of Service attacks are mentioned below. These 
attacks use the techniques mentioned in the section above. 
2.2 Known Distributed Denial of Service Attacks  
2.2.1 Trinoo 
One of the most popular DDoS attacks is the Trinoo attack where the attack 
daemons use UDP flood attacks to disable the victim. It consists of an attacker system, 
several compromised systems, which include one or more masters (referred to as 
handlers), one or more daemon systems (referred to as agents), and one or more victims. 
The attack begins by loading the Trinoo program on one or more compromised systems. 
These systems act as handlers and agents. The agents send a UDP packet to let the 
handler know that the agent systems are ready. When the attack system sends the attack 
command, the handler sends a message to the agents to launch the attack. After receiving 
the command to launch an attack, the agent sends a UDP flood to random port numbers 
on the victim. This attack was experienced in 1999 by University of Massachusetts. 
2.2.2 Tribe Flood Network 
The TFN attack is more complicated than a Trinoo attack. The TFN software is 
loaded by the TFN attacker onto compromised systems. In order to launch the attack, the 
10 
 
attack systems simply need remote access to the handler. TFN’s attacks daemons can 
implement Smurf, SYN flood, UDP flood and ICMP flood attacks.  
2.2.3 Stacheldraht 
Stacheldraht is a combination of Trinoo and TFN attack and relies on TCP for 
transport. The handlers and agents periodically exchange ICMP reply packets. It encrypts 
the communication between the attacker and the masters and performs automated update 
of the agents. It can implement Smurf, SYN flood, UDP flood and ICMP flood attacks. 
[14] 
2.3 Prevalence of Distributed Denial of Service attacks  
Businesses have been shut down for several hours by faceless hackers in the past. 
The DDoS attack slows the system performance and ultimately crashes the system. This 
section talks about some of the DDoS attacks experienced in the last decade.  
DoS attacks crippled high visibility Internet websites like Yahoo, CNN and major 
ecommerce sites like Amazon.com and Buy.com which were down for three hours as a 
result of the attack in the February of 2000.  The sites started behaving poorly with the 
Amazon site timing out at various stages throughout the night. Yahoo experienced traffic 
levels of 1 GB per second. This attack is believed to have been a DDoS where multiple 
compromised machines were involved.  
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In January 2001, Microsoft’s name server infrastructure was disabled by a Denial 
of Service assault. The root DNS servers were targeted in the following year and SCO’s 
corporate website was incapacitated in late 2003. [15] 
Recently, in August 2009, a string of major websites experienced a DDoS attack. 
This DDoS was interesting as the attack seems to have been URLs embedded in spam. 
People clicking on the spam links generated enough traffic to kill the websites. The 
malicious online attacks affected services of major social networking websites like 
Facebook, Twitter and Google.  Facebook encountered network issues that resulted in 
degraded service for some of the users. Twitter’s website was unavailable for at least two 
hours. [16] 
The military has been the victim of cyber attacks in the past. [3] A National 
Security Agency red team of hackers was organized to infiltrate the Pentagon systems. 
The team was able to infiltrate and take control of the Pacific command centre 
computers, as well as power grids and 911 systems in nine major US cities. Code Red 
was a worm that first appeared in 2001 and ultimately affected nearly 300,000 computers 
in the United States. It exploited a hole in Microsoft’s IIS web servers. In its first 
variation, the affected computers were programmed to launch a denial of service attack 
against the White House website at a certain date and time. [17]  
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2.3.1 Information Warfare 
The cyber attack in Estonia was considered as the first war in cyberspace. It was 
deemed as a national security situation.  In Estonia, ‘ the most wired country’, the 
Internet is vital and is used routinely to vote, file taxes, and even to shop or pay for 
parking. The bulk of the cyber assaults used DDoS to bombard the country's Web sites 
with data. The attackers clogged not only the country's servers, but also made it difficult 
to direct traffic on the network. In one of the first attacks, a flood of junk messages were 
thrown at the e-mail server of the Parliament, shutting it down. In another, hackers broke 
into the Web site of the Reform Party, posting a fake letter of apology from the prime 
minister. Traffic spiked to thousand times the normal flow. The biggest bank in Estonia 
had to shut down its online service for more than an hour. It suffered losses of about $1 
million. The 10 largest assaults blasted streams of 90 Mbps of data at Estonia’s networks. 
The attackers used a giant network of bots – perhaps as many as one million computers as 
far as Vietnam and United States, to amplify the impact of their assault. There is evidence 
that they rented time on other so-called botnets.  [18] 
 The vast majority of attacks are not even publicized. The victims include a wide 
range of targets victims from small commercial sites to education institutions. The work 
in [15] is based on backscatter analysis to estimate the worldwide prevalence of denial of 
service attacks. They established an alarming presence of roughly 2000 – 3000 active 
denial of service attacks per week. 
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2.4 What makes DDoS attacks possible? 
We elaborate some of the design issues of the Internet which makes DDoS attacks 
possible [6]. 
1. The end-to-end paradigm pushes the complexity to end hosts, leaving the 
intermediate network simple and optimized for packet forwarding. Thus if one 
party in a two way communication misbehaves; it can do arbitrary damage to its 
peer.  
2. Attacks are commonly launched from systems that are subverted through security 
related compromises. So regardless of how well secured the victim system may 
be, its susceptibility depends on the state of the security of the global internet.  
3. Since each Internet entity has limited resources, it can be consumed if there are 
too many users. 
4. The intelligence needed for service guarantees resides with the end hosts. High 
bandwidth pathways are available in the intermediate network, while the end 
networks have bandwidth only as much as they need.  Thus malicious clients can 
misuse the abundant resources of the intermediate network for delivery of 
numerous messages to a less provisioned victim. 
5. Due to IP spoofing, attackers get a powerful mechanism to escape accountability 
for their actions. 
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2.5 Reasons for DDoSing 
There can be numerous reasons for a DDoS, the primary goal being to inflict 
damage on the victim. The true victim of the attack might not be the actual target, but 
others who rely on the target’s correct operation. The reasons for DDoS could be 
personal where an attack can be perpetrated for the purpose of revenge or they could be 
material in which the attack damages a competitor’s resources. The attacks could be 
performed by hackers simply to gain respect (by successfully attacking popular websites) 
or may be performed for serious political reasons where a country at war could perpetrate 
attacks against its enemy’s critical resources.  Victims may be blackmailed into paying to 
avoid DDoS attacks. Recent reports have botnets being rented for performing DDoS 
attacks at a rate of $1000 per spam or DDoS event [39]. 
2.6 Challenges faced in DDoS Defense 
There are several serious factors that hinder the advance of DDoS research. We list some 
of them in this section [6]. 
1. There are very few DDoS attacks which can be handled only by the victim. In 
order to deal with DDoS, it often becomes necessary to have a distributed and 
coordinated response system.  The Internet being a system which itself is 
administered in a distributed manner, it is difficult to enforce cooperation between 
networks which discourages researchers from designing distributed solutions.  
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2. Deployment of a distributed response system implies that parties that will bear the 
deployment cost are parties that do not suffer direct damage and hence do not 
benefit directly from the system.  
3. There is lack of information on attack parameters used for popular DDoS attacks 
since publicly reporting DDoS attacks damages the reputation of the victim 
4. There is no bench mark suite of attack scenarios that enables comparison between 
defense systems [6]. 
2.7 Previous Work 
We consider mechanisms for constructing distributed DDoS defense that do not 
require cooperation among uninvolved parties. The results in this thesis build on previous 
research documented in [11]. The work in [11] analyzes a two player game played on a 
computer network in which Player 1 (Blue player) is a legitimate distributed application 
on a network and Player 2 (Red player) is an attacker who places zombie processes in the 
network with an intention of attacking node capacities or flooding the arcs between 
nodes. By finding out the minimum number of zombies needed to disable Blue’s 
network, the authors quantify the resistance of the Blue player to DDoS attacks. This 
approach helps to design networks with a structure that either resist DDoS attacks or 
adapt around them. This result is relevant to item 4 in Section 2.6 in that it provides a 
metric for comparing DDoS countermeasures. 
The mincut of a network configuration is a set of network edges whose removal 
prevents source communication with the destination. The attacker would be interested in 
16 
 
determining the smallest number of arcs that need to be disabled from this mincut. The 
authors in [11] describe an algorithm to determine the minimum number of arcs that need 
to be disabled between the source and the destination to avoid the attacker wasting 
resources attacking arcs that need not be attacked.  
Once the arcs that need to be disabled are known, the work further determines the 
amount of flow to be directed towards these arcs in order to disable them. If RT denotes 
the minimum amount of traffic that should be generated by the zombies (also called red 
traffic), λ denotes the Blue (Legitimate) traffic required by Blue’s application and C 
represents that capacity of the physical arc to be attacked, then the total traffic T is given 
by 
 
( )T RTλ= +
 (2.1) 
The traffic dropped is represented as D 
 
( )D RT Cλ= + −
 (2.2) 
Percentage of legitimate traffic in the total traffic P is given by 
 
/ ( )P RTλ λ= +
 (2.3) 
Expected rate of legitimate traffic loss (LTL) is given by 
 
/ ( )[( ) ]LTL RT RT Cλ λ λ= + + −
 (2.4) 
If the Blue slack traffic is BS, then the attacker wins in flooding the arc if 
 LTL BS≥  (2.5) 
where  
 
BS Capacity -[Blue Flow]=
 (2.6) 
From equations (2.4) and (2.5) 
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 BS LTL≤  (2.7) 
Solving further, we get 
 
( ) ( )BS RT RT Cλ λ
λ
+
∴ ≤ + −  (2.8) 
Thus the minimum amount of Red traffic required is given by 
 
1 ( )
CRT BS λ
λ
= −
−
 (2.9) 
where 
 BS C λ= −  (2.10) 
Equation (2.9) represents the threshold value of the zombie traffic that should be 
generated to disable an arc.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
SSFNET NETWORK SIMULATOR 
 
3.1 Purpose of Simulations 
Communication networks are rapidly increasing in complexity, volume, and cost. 
This has been exponential in the recent past, making it imperative to study the behavior 
of a network before it is deployed. An experimental network test bed comes across as a 
practical approach to observe network behavior. However, the cost and time involved in 
deploying such a test bed is the same as deploying the network itself, making such a 
study infeasible.  
Simulations are a cost effective solution to this problem. They are inexpensive, 
and quickly deployed. Network simulation tools help researchers and developers estimate 
network functionality and performance prior to deployment. They are a virtual 
environment for testing the performance of new networking protocols. They model 
networks and analyze their performance under different scenarios. To make network 
operations effective, simulations can inspect the vulnerabilities that may exist in the 
network.  Simulations are often used in test scenarios where it is difficult and infeasible 
to use network hardware. Simulations provide a controlled and reproducible environment 
for simulating network attacks. 
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Simulators allow users to specify the nodes in a network, the links connecting 
nodes and the flow over links [19]. Most simulators offer a programming framework 
through which the user can customize the network environment. They reflect the 
behavior of network components like routers, multiple hosts and various types of network 
links. The following sections explain the reasons SSFNet is suitable for simulating large 
networks.  
3.2 Scalable Simulation Framework 
The Scalable Simulation framework is written in Java and C++. The framework 
(SSF) allows discrete-event simulation for large complex networks. [20] Researchers 
have used this framework to design network simulators like DaSSF and SSFNet.  
3.3 SSFNet 
SSFNet has a single integrated interface which can be used to design networks. It 
models Internet protocols at and above the network layer.  
The Internet consists of a large number of heterogeneous network elements making it 
difficult to simulate. The Internet is an ‘immense moving target” which grows at an 
exponential rate undergoing dramatic qualitative changes over time [21]. The scalable 
simulation framework was developed as a scalable model of the Internet. SSFNet has a 
modular structure, allowing additional packages to be used to model specific domains. 
This strategy promotes independence of models from the simulation fabric and liberates 
the simulation fabric from the specifics of parallel discrete-event simulation engines [19]. 
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SSFNet describes a series of objects which when combined make it possible to define 
large networks. The simulation sizes that can be handled are directly proportional to the 
processing power of the system the simulations are run on.   
The SSFNet distribution consists of two frameworks - SSF.OS and SSF.Net. Any 
Internet model can be constructed using these frameworks. The simulator architecture 
consists of three main components. 
1. DML (Domain Modeling Language): The network configuration files 
needed for running simulations are written in DML. DML files consist of a 
hierarchical list of recursively defined attribute value pairs. [22] 
2. SSF: It is a public domain standard for discrete event simulations of large 
complex networks.  
3. SSFNet: This is a collection of SSF based open source Java models of 
protocols, network elements and supported classes. This consists of SSF 
Network models for modeling and simulation. [23] 
Figure 3.1 shows the SSFNet simulation layers 
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Figure 3.1 Simulation layers in SSFNet 
3.4 SSFNet Objects 
SSFNet segments the network structure into groups. Groups are repeated as necessary 
and patched together to create large networks. 
3.4.1 Net 
The top level Net cannot have an ID. Every network configuration is simply the 
value of the Net attribute enclosed within Net […]. The included Net is a collection of 
Hosts, Routers and links and must contain a single ID value or a range of ID values, 
which identify the network it is configuring.  The ID values should be unique.  
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3.4.2 Frequency  
The frequency parameter sets the time resolution of the simulation as the number 
of simulation ticks per clock second. For instance, if the frequency is set to 1000000, then 
the simulated time will advance by intervals measured in microseconds. It is used only in 
the top level Net.  
3.4.3 Host 
A host could be a client computer or a server. It can have zero or more configured 
interfaces.  The host must have an ID value assigned to it and the ID values must be 
unique for a particular Net loop. 
3.4.4 Graph 
The graph component specifies the list of protocols to be used. It is mandatory for 
every host to have a graph attribute in its definition. The graph attribute has a number of 
sub attributes within it and there is one graph per installed protocol. The ‘name’ is a 
symbolic tag by which a protocol implementation finds its configuration and ‘use’ 
specifies the SSFNet class that should be loaded to do the protocol’s job. 
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Figure 3.2 Graph attribute 
3.4.5 Interface 
The interface facilitates the configuration of the network interface of the Ethernet 
card. The interface also needs to have an ID value which uniquely identifies network 
interfaces for a particular host. A host may have multiple interfaces, but typically has one 
or two. A router can have multiple interfaces as in the case of our simulation. An 
important attribute of the interface is the bitrate which specifies the rate at which packets 
leave the interface. The default bitrate in SSFNet is 10 Mbps. In our simulation, we have 
specified the bitrate for every interface to be between 6000000 and 7000000 bps. The 
latency attribute of an interface specifies the delay introduced by the interface itself. The 
queue and the buffer attributes are optional. The queue specifies the queue manager for a 
particular interface whereas the buffer attribute specifies the buffer of the queue in bytes.  
If the size of the incoming packet is greater than the currently available free buffer space, 
then the packet is dropped. It is possible to assign an IP address to an interface. If one is 
not assigned, then the simulator assigns one. 
 
 
  graph [ 
   ProtocolSession [ 
    name foo 
    use SSF.OS.bar 
    other protocol-dependent parameters 
   ] 
  ] 
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3.4.6 Router 
The router component is similar to the host component.  The difference is that it 
will have distinct protocols in its graph component. It could be considered as an 
intermediate host which cannot originate data.  
3.4.7 Link 
 It specifies a link layer connection. It connects a set of hosts, or router interfaces. 
It must include the attribute ‘attach’ which specifies the attached network interfaces. The 
delay attribute specifies the contribution of the link to the total transmission delay.  
3.4.8 Traffic 
 The traffic component specifies the traffic scenario for different client/servers. It 
is used by protocols like TCP, UDP and HTTP. Traffic could have one or more sub 
patterns and each pattern should specify one client attribute and one or more server 
attributes. The client should be specified with the NHI address of the host or client. The 
format for the traffic attribute is as shown in Figure 3.3 
           
 
   
 
Figure 3.3 Traffic attribute 
  traffic [ 
   pattern [ 
    client 2 
    servers [nhi 1(0) port 1600] 
   ] 
  ] 
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3.5 Addressing 
NHI addressing is used as an internal addressing format for model building 
convenience [33]. It has the form as shown in equation (3.1). 
 
: : : ....... : ( )N N N N H I
 (3.1) 
Where N represents the network ID, H is the host ID, and I is the interface ID. 
The addressing uses concatenated IDs of each network from the outermost network to the 
innermost network/host which are separated by colons, followed by the interface number 
(NIC ID) in parenthesis after the host containing the interface. For instance, if a Network 
with ID 1 contains a host with ID 3 which has an interface ID 4, then the interface would 
have a NHI address that is represented as 1:3(4). Figure 3.4 shows a simple example of a 
network with two networks and a host in each network. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 A simple network configuration 
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The individual networks are defined as in Figure 3.5 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Net definition 
The top level Net is defined as shown in Figure 3.6 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Top level Net definition. 
CIDR addresses may also be explicitly assigned to a network or link. If they are not 
assigned, then SSF.Net.Net automatically computes them relative to the Net in which 
they are defined. The IP addresses may be assigned manually, or by using optional 
attributes to guide the IP address algorithm implemented by SSFNet or could be 
automatically assigned if no attributes are provided. 
 
 
 
  Net[ 
   Host [id 1 interface [id 1]] 
   link [attach 1(1) attach 0(1)] 
  ] 
 
  Net[ 
   Net [id 1 …..] 
   Net [id 2 …..] 
   link [attach 1:0(0) attach 2:0(0)] 
  ] 
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3.6 Protocol Implementation in SSFNet 
3.6.1 IP implementation  
The IP implementation in SSFNet keeps tracks of all the interfaces configured on 
a particular host or router and the IP addresses of the interfaces that are attached to the 
links. Routes are not computed by SSF.OS.IP but are computed by routing protocols. The 
IP protocol session decrements the TTL field in the IP header and drops the packet when 
the field decrements below zero. The packet is pushed down to the next hop interface by 
the host/router if the destination is not reached. If the host/router is the destination, then 
the packet is pushed up to the appropriate protocol mentioned in the Protocol Session. 
3.6.2 OSPF implementation  
In our simulation, the routers use the OSPF protocol to compute the routing 
tables. The specification of the OSPF protocol occurs in the router’s Protocol Graph 
specification.  At the start of the simulation, protocol finds all the neighbor routers, 
creates the link state database and computes the routes. The static version of the link state 
protocol (sOSPF) is used in our simulations, which is a simplified version of the OSPFv2 
protocol. This protocol implementation does not perform load balancing between paths of 
equal cost.  
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3.6.3 UDP implementation  
We use client server models with UDP streaming traffic. The UDP client 
configuration should specify the earliest time to send a request to the UDP server and 
must specify the size of the requested file in bytes. The UDP server configures itself with 
the parameters specified in the DML file. These parameters include the datagram size 
which is the payload in bytes and the send interval which specifies the interval between 
two consecutive chunks of data. The client sends one integer specifying the amount of 
data it wants to the server’s well known address. On receiving a client’s request, the 
server spawns a slave server which periodically sends the requested datagram size to the 
client until all the bytes of the file are sent [24]. UDP is used, since it does not contain 
flow control. TCP contains end to end flow control, which decreases transmission speed 
exponentially once packets start being dropped. In the context of our study, this has the 
following drawbacks: 
• It would make flooding DDoS attacks aimed at decreasing available 
bandwidth easier to implement, 
• It makes it impossible to exactly quantify the throughput rates that can be 
achieved during a DDoS, and 
• TCP was designed to provide reasonable throughput for a set of 
cooperating network flows. It does not provide reasonable strategies for either 
performing or countering selfish DDoS attacks. 
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3.7 Simulation software environment 
The automation of the network generation process is performed using the Python 
programming language. The version used is 2.5; however some of the libraries from 
version 2.6 are also required. The Python plugin - Pydev is integrated in the Eclipse 
software environment. Pydev is installed by the Eclipse update manager which 
automatically downloads the plugin from the website entered. The maxflow mincut 
program is written in Matlab. The input from Python is appropriately converted to a 
format accepted by Matlab. 
3.8 Simple SSFNet Examples 
In this section, we discuss some simple simulation examples to illustrate SSFNet. 
3.8.1 Configuration 1 
The network configuration simulated had the structure shown in Figure 3.7. Since 
the connections between networks are between the routers of the corresponding networks, 
the interface of the router of Network 1 is connected to the interface of the router of 
Network 2. Network 1 and 3 each consist of two hosts as shown in Figure 3.7. The clients 
in Network 3 request a certain amount of data from the corresponding servers in Network 
1. The data flows from the server to the client according to the UDP client server 
implementation in SSFNet. In the simulation, both clients request a file size of 3000000 
bytes and the data gram size is set to 1000 bytes, so 3000 packets are sent by each server 
to their corresponding clients. The simulations are made to start at the same time. This is 
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achieved by adjusting the start time and the start window parameters in the client 
configuration in the DML file. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Simulation of 3 networks 
 
It is necessary to choose the send interval and the datagram size such that the resulting 
bandwidth does not exceed the bit rate specified on the server’s host link interface. The 
following parameters need to be changed in the DML script to achieve this.  
- The rate at which the server generates data. This is defined by the attribute 
‘send interval’ in the server definition 
- The bitrate of the interface of the server which connects to the router of the 
network. This is also included in the definition of the server. 
- The bitrate of the interface of the router which goes to the server.  This is 
included in the definition of the Network. 
Table 3.1 shows the amount of data received in bytes at the clients.  
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Link a Link b Data received from 
standard server (bytes) 
Data receive from 
attack server (bytes) 
8000000 8000000 1503000 bytes 6000 bytes 
8500000 8000000 798000 711000 
9000000 8000000 505000 1004000 
10000000 8000000 305000 1204000 
 
Table 3.1 Data received for different bitrates for Configuration 1 
The DML script for the above configuration can be found in Appendix A. 
3.8.2 Configuration 2 
In the second configuration, the servers are placed a hop away from the mincut 
arc.  Figure 3.8 shows the configuration that is simulated. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Simulation of 5 networks 
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Link a Link b Drops received from 
attack server (bytes) 
Data received from 
standard server (bytes) 
4000000 4000000 9000  3000000  
4000000 5000000 613000 2396000 
4000000 6000000 1007000 2003000 
4000000 8000000 1505000 1505000 
  
Table 3.2 Data received for different bitrates for Configuration 2 
From the observations tabulated, it is clear that as the data generation rate of the attack 
server increases, the number of drops observed for the legitimate traffic also increases. 
The DML script for Configuration 2 is shown in Appendix B.  
3.8.3 Configuration 3 
The configuration in figure 3.9 was simulated to understand the working of the 
OSPF protocol in SSFNet. The static version of the OSPF protocol (sOSPF) in SSFNet 
uses the hop count as the cost attribute for routing packets from the source to the 
destination. For all paths having the same cost to the destination, the path having the next 
hop as the smallest network ID is selected.  This is verified by simulating the 
configuration in Figure 3.9. The packets are routed along path 1 -2 4- 6.  The sOSPF 
protocol in SSFNet does not perform load balancing across equal cost links.  
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Figure 3.9 Network configuration for OSPF verification 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
            DML SCRIPT GENERATION 
 
Our aim is to simulate Distributed Denial of Service attacks for large scale 
networks. We use the SSFNet simulator for this task, because it is capable of simulating 
larger networks than its competitors (ex. Ns-2). To run the simulations, network 
configuration files need to be written using the Domain Modeling Language (DML) in 
SSFNet.  
As the size of the DML script details all the nodes and links in the network, it is 
impractical to manually generate DML scripts for a number of large networks as the 
process could be time consuming and error prone. Figure 4.1 shows a configuration of 
400 networks. 
 
Figure 4.1. Network diagram of 400 nodes. 
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To generate large scripts that are consistent, we automate the process using 
Python. Network size is the only input to the script. Python outputs a DML script with the 
appropriate number of networks. Networks of any size can be generated; the only limiting 
factor is the processing power of the system which handles the simulation.  For this 
thesis, we created networks of up to 400 sub-networks. 
4.1 Graph Theory 
Graphs are commonly used to model the structure of the internet for the study of 
various problems. This section reviews some of the concepts of graph theory.  
Graph: A graph is defined as a graphical representation of a network where the hosts are 
represented as vertices of the graph and the links connecting these hosts are represented 
by edges of the graph. A graph is traditionally defined as the tuple [V, E] where V is a set 
of vertices and E is the set of edges. Each edge e in defined as (i, j) where i and j 
represent the two vertices connected by e. In the work done in this thesis, we consider 
graphs that are undirected (where (i,j) = (j,i)) and are not multigraphs (where multiple 
edges connect the same end points) 
Connectivity: Two nodes A and B are connected if the graph contains at least one path 
from node A to node B [34]. 
Source node: A node that is the starting point of a flow is called as a source node or 
simply a source. 
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Sink node: A node where the flow terminates is called as the sink node or destination. 
Max-flow: In a network graph, the max-flow is the maximum possible flow that one can 
route from the source to the destination [34]. 
Min-cut: The min-cut is the smallest set of edges or arcs that are necessary for a source 
to communicate with a sink. The removal of these edges disconnects the source from the 
sink. 
Connectivity matrix: The connectivity matrix M is a square matrix where each element 
m(i,j) is 1(0) if there is (not) an edge connecting the vertices i and j [35]. In case of 
undirected graphs, this matrix is symmetric. The diagonal of this matrix could consist of 
either 0s or 1s depending on the simple assumption that each vertex is connected to itself 
[35]. 
Walk: A walk is defined as an ordered list of z edges [(i0 ,j0). (i1 ,j1),…. (iz ,jz)], where 
each vertex ja  is the same as vertex ia+1.  
Path: A path of length z is a walk where all ia are unique. 
Cycle: If jz is the same as i0, the path is a cycle. 
A random graph starts as a set of n isolated vertices and develops by successively 
acquiring edges at random. [25] We use this theorem 6.10 from [25] (where t is the 
number of edges in the random graph and n the number of nodes): 
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Theorem 1: The global structure of a typical random graph Gt becomes surprisingly 
simple as time grows substantially larger than the phase transition time (t = n/2): it 
contains no small components with many edges and all its small components have order 
O(log n).  
It is important to have a giant component for the simulation. The giant component is the 
largest component of a random graph after the phase change described by Theorem 1. It 
contains O(n) nodes.  The expected number of hops between nodes in these graphs grows 
proportionally to the log of the number of nodes [36]. If E represents the number of edges 
in the graph, when E – n/2 < -n 2/3, the graph is in a subcritical phase and almost certainly 
not connected.  A phase change occurs in the critical phase where E = n/2 + O(n2/3) and in 
the supercritical phase where E – n/2  > -n 2/3, a single giant component becomes almost 
certain. When E = n log n/2 + O (n), the graph is fully connected. [37] 
The expected number of edges for a graph is n (n-1)p/2 where p is the uniform 
probability of an edge existing between any two nodes.  
 
2/3( 1) ( )
2 2
n n p n O n− = +  (4.1) 
Thus the probability of an existence of an edge between two nodes at the phase change is 
given by 
 
2/31 ( )
1
p O n
n
≈ +
−
 (4.2) 
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Our simulations therefore require p greater than 1/n to insure the existence of a giant 
component. 
4.2 Max-flow min-cut 
Theorem 2: The max-flow min-cut theorem states that the maximum of all flows is equal 
to the minimum of all cut capacities. [38] 
The concept of max-flow min-cut is illustrated with the help of the example 
shown in Figure 4.2. If node 1 is the source and node 6 is the destination, then there are 
two paths from the source to the destination – path A which is 1-2-4-6 and path B which 
is 1-3-5-6. The maximum flow over path A is bounded by arc 1-2 which has a capacity of 
2. The maximum flow over path B is bounded by arc 5-6 which also has a capacity of 2. 
Since these paths are disjoint the maximum flow from the source to the destination is 6. 
The removal of arc 1-2 in path A and arc 5-6 in path B completely disconnects the source 
from the destination. So the mincut is the set of arcs 1-2 and 5-6. [11] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Max-flow min-cut for a graph. 
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4.3 Script Generation Process 
We generate a random graph where the probability that an arc exists between 
nodes i and j is pi,j, which is constant for all i and j.   The most important part in our script 
generation process is the network connectivity matrix denoted by mconn.   pi,j determines 
how well populated mconn will be and should be varied depending on the network size.   
The connectivity matrix is a matrix of all the links that exist between any two 
networks. It has a form as shown in (4.3).   
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 (4.3) 
The element mconn[i][j] in the connectivity matrix signifies the connection from 
network i to network j. A zero element indicates that there is no connection between the 
networks represented by the element’s indices.  mconn is a symmetric matrix and since a 
network need not have a connection to itself, the diagonal elements of the matrix are 
zero. The non-zero elements of the matrix which are generated with a probability of pi,j 
have arbitrary values between 6000000 and 7000000. This number specifies the bitrate at 
which the interfaces between the corresponding networks communicate.  
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The network IDs have values starting from 1. So, if mconn[1][0] ≠ 0, there exists a 
connection between Network 2 and Network 1. Since mconn is a symmetric matrix, 
elements are generated randomly above the diagonal and the elements below the diagonal 
have the same values as their corresponding mirror elements. So if 
 
[1][0]
[0][1]
0
0
conn
conn
m
then m
≠
≠
 (4.4) 
 For every network, the description is enclosed in a network loop in the DML 
script and has a structure as shown in the figure 4.3. There are two hosts, two servers and 
one router in every network. The following convention has been maintained in every 
network, 
Host 1 is a standard server 
Host 2 is an attack server 
Host 3 is a standard server 
Host 4 is an attack server 
All connections between networks are via routers.  The router of every network 
has multiple interfaces and these interfaces are connected via links to other networks. 
There can be only one link per interface so the number of links originating in or 
terminating at a network directly determines the number of interfaces required by the 
router of the network. 
41 
 
The interface details of the router are defined in the router loop which is included 
in the network loop. The first four interfaces (interface 0/1/2/3) are allocated to the 
internal hosts of the network. This pattern is followed for all the networks in the script to 
maintain consistency. The interface details within a network are as shown in the figure 
4.3. The interfaces from 4 are free to be assigned to the links between networks.   
The interface numbers are assigned sequentially in the connectivity matrix 
starting from 4 in a column wise fashion. If N represents the total number of networks, m 
represents the row number and n represents the column number, then the interface 
number for each non-zero element in mconn is calculated using equation 4.5. The 
interfaces are generated only for the elements below the diagonal. 
 
4interface number n N m= ∗ + +
 (4.5) 
As mentioned earlier, the links in SSFNet are bidirectional so there is only one 
direct link between any two networks. 
 
Figure 4.3 Interface details of a network in a simulation 
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The network loop for every individual network consists of a definition of the router, the 
hosts in the network and the link which connects the router and the host within the 
network. The router and the host definitions consist of definition of their own interfaces.  
4.3.1 Top level Net 
Once all the individual networks are defined, the main Network loop is defined 
which contains the links which connect the individual networks together. Similar to the 
interfaces, the links are created only for the elements either above or below the diagonal. 
The links are defined in the format as in (4.6) 
link[attach network_id1:0(interface_no) attach network_id2:0(interface_no) delay 0.0]
 (4.6) 
Here network_id1 and network_id2 are the networks between which the link exists.   
4.3.2 Traffic 
The traffic attribute in the Network loop defines the traffic components that are 
involved in sending and receiving traffic. The client and the server are defined in the 
dictionary component of the DML script. When a blue traffic pattern is specified, the 
standard client directs traffic to a standard server in some other network. Similarly the 
attack client sends traffic to the attack server when a red traffic pattern is specified. The 
need for having separate servers in a network arises because of the necessity to adjust the 
rates of both the servers exclusively.  
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The dictionary is used to define all the common components that are used 
throughout the DML script. Once the network is set up, the next phase involves finding 
two nodes to place the blue nodes.  
4.3.3 Determining blue node placement 
This is done by the Python script. The blue source and the destination nodes are 
selected so that no blue destination is less than four hops from the blue source.  
Theorem 3: If M = mconn, and if 
 
4 3 2[ ][ ] 0conn m i j  in M M M M+ + + ≠  (4.7) 
 and 
 
3 2[ ][ ] 0connm i j  in M M M+ + =  (4.8) 
   
 then there exists two nodes which are at least four hops away from each other.  
Proof: Each non zero element (j, k) represents the existence of an edge between the 
nodes j and k. The result of multiplying M with itself is M2. Each non-zero element of M2 
except the diagonals represents the existence of a path of length two between the nodes j 
and k [35]. By proof of induction, every non zero element of M3 represents the existence 
of a path of length three between nodes j and k.  If equation (4.8) is true, then it implies 
that there exist no paths between nodes j and k which are connected by three hops or 
lesser. If equation (4.7) is satisfied, then it implies that the nodes are connected by either 
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one, two, three or four hops. If both equations are satisfied, then it implies that the nodes 
are connected by at least four hops. 
   The chance of finding a combination of blue nodes which are at least four hops 
away from each other depends on the arc generation probability pij. For a scenario of 400 
networks, pij is set to 0.03 (since 1/400 < 0.03 according to Theorem 1 in section 4.1) to 
ensure that there is sufficient connectivity between networks and the required 
configuration is found. On finding one such configuration, the script stops computing the 
possible locations for placing the blue nodes. Blue traffic is directed from the blue source 
to the blue destination and is included in the traffic component of the DML script. If the 
script fails to find such a combination, then the configuration must be ignored and the 
program must be rerun till such a situation occurs.  
4.4 Mincut Arcs 
The non-zero elements are fed as input to the maxflow Matlab program in the 
format shown in (4.9). The maxflow program determines the mincut set of arcs between 
two specific network nodes; in this case the two nodes are the blue source and the blue 
destination.  
 
from_network    to_network    capacity_of_link
 (4.9) 
where from_network is the network ID from where the link originates,  
to_network is the network ID where the link terminates,  
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capacity_of_the_link is the capacity of the link between the two networks. 
By definition, at least one of the mincut arcs has to be on the four hop path 
between the blue source and the blue destination. The output of the Matlab code is a set 
of all mincut arcs between the blue source and the blue destination. Once the mincut arcs 
are known, the zombie locations can be determined. For a large network, there is a high 
probability that there will be multiple mincut arcs between the blue source and the blue 
destination.   
The algorithm in [11] determines how many mincut arcs need to be disabled to 
stop Blue from sending a given volume of traffic. Call denotes the summation of the 
capacities of all the mincut arcs and the blue traffic is chosen as a random value between 
Call/2 and Call. This is justified using equations (4.10) and (4.11), where if C is the 
capacity of a mincut arc, then  
 1C λ
λ
−
<  (4.10) 
 
2
C Cλ< <  (4.11) 
The number of arcs that need to be disabled to send the calculated amount of blue traffic 
can then be calculated using the algorithm.  
4.5 Zombie placement 
With an intention of flooding the mincut arcs, zombies are placed near the arc 
sources. In our simulations, the zombies (Red nodes) are placed a hop away from the 
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source node. This is accomplished by inspecting the column corresponding to the source 
of the mincut arc in mconn. The zombie location is selected by randomly choosing one out 
of the possible zombie locations.  For example, as shown in the figure 4.4, the possible 
zombie locations could be nodes 1, 2, 3 or 4 as all these have outgoing arcs to the mincut 
source.  
 
Figure 4.4 Possible zombie locations 
The zombie destination is the destination of the mincut arc. The zombie server is placed 
on the destination.  Also, we ensure that no direct connection exists between the zombie 
source and the zombie destination.  Once the zombie source and destination nodes are 
finalized, they are included in the traffic component as the Red traffic. 
 This completes the script generation process.  
4.6 Selecting one mincut arc at a time 
The OSPF protocol in SSFNet does not perform load balancing; it chooses the 
least cost path to route traffic from the blue source to the blue destination.  This is 
contradictory to the way traffic flows in the Internet. To deal with this problem, we 
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consider each mincut arc sequentially by disconnecting all but one mincut arc at a time 
and rerunning the simulation for all the mincut arcs individually.  
We start with the mincut arc having the maximum capacity. For a Blue traffic rate of 
6000000 bits per second, the Red traffic rate needed to flood the arc is calculated using 
Equation (2.9). This is the threshold value of the Red traffic denoted by Rthresh. Readings 
are taken by varying the Red traffic rate above and below this value and keeping the Blue 
traffic rate constant.  
This procedure is followed for all of the mincut arcs and the results are recorded.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SIMUALTION SCENARIO AND RESULTS 
In this chapter, we illustrate the simulations explained in Chapter 4 with an 
example.  
5.1 Simulation Scenario 
The scenario consists of 400 nodes. The network graph is generated by setting pij 
in the Python script. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Blue players are placed on two nodes 
which are at least four hops away. The zombie locations are calculated after knowing the 
details of the mincut arcs in the network. Figure 5.1 details the network configuration 
obtained. Nodes 10 and 159 are chosen as blue node locations.  
 
Figure 5.1: 400 Node configuration 
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Figure 5.2: Node configuration details of the Network 
 
The node configuration details are shown in the Figure 5.2. Blue traffic flows 
from node 10 (B1) to node 159 (B2). There are six mincut arcs between the blue source 
and the blue destination (M1 to M6). The mincut arcs are centered on the destination.  
According to the algorithm detailed in [11] four out of the six mincut arcs need to be 
disabled.  The zombies are placed on Z1, Z2, Z3 and Z4 corresponding to the four mincut 
arcs. The Red traffic flows from the zombie source to the zombie destination which is the 
same as the mincut arc destination in this case. The amount of data requested by the Blue 
and the Red clients is the same. 
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We first target the mincut arc with the maximum capacity. In our case, this is link 
M1, between nodes 256 – 159. The link has a capacity of 6916382 bits per second. The 
zombie is placed on node 377.  The configuration is as shown in Figure 5.3. The attack 
traffic flows from the red server (node 159) to the red client (node 377) whereas the 
legitimate traffic flows from the blue server (node 159) to the blue client (node 10).  
 
Figure 5.3: Mincut Arc 1 
 
The red traffic rate threshold (Rthresh) is calculated for a constant blue traffic rate 
of 6000000 bps using the Equation (2.9). The red traffic rate is increased from 500000 
bps to 7000000 bps and the effective bandwidth allocated to Blue and Red is noted down. 
On increasing the red traffic value above the threshold value, a significant reduction in 
blue bandwidth is observed. This is shown in Graph 5.1. Thus by increasing the rate at 
which an attacker generates data, he can limit the bandwidth allocated to the legitimate 
source and effectively cause a DDoS attack. 
 
 Graph 5.1: Bandwidth allocated to players with increase in Red Traffic rate
 
The procedure is followed for all three remaining mincut arcs. 
detail the configuration of the arcs.
Figure 5.4: Mincut Arc 2 
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Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 
 
                     
    Figure 5.5: Mincut Arc 3
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Figure 5.6: Mincut Arc 4 
The graphs for these configurations have similar results. To prevent repetition, they have 
not been included in this thesis.  
Graph 5.2 shows the drops observed by the total traffic (Red and Blue) over all 
the four mincut arcs. It can be seen that the arc with the maximum capacity observes the 
least number of drops. Also as the red traffic rate increases, the number of drops increase 
linearly which is in line with our understanding. 
 
Graph 5.2: Drops observed by the traffic for all mincut arcs 
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 To check the effectiveness of the DDoS attack when the legitimate source increases the 
amount of traffic we increase the blue traffic rate from 4000000 bps to 5500000 bps. It 
should be noted that the blue traffic rate has to be greater than half the capacity of the 
mincut arc. The red traffic rate was set to the value obtained from the formula. It can be 
observed that the blue bandwidth is limited to a particular value and in spite of the 
increase in the blue traffic rate, the blue bandwidth does not increase. This is shown in 
Graph 5.3. 
Graph 5.3: Bandwidth allocated to Players with increase in Blue traffic rate
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5500000
 In absence of red traffic, the effective bandwidth occupied by Blue approac
rate at which the Blue server generates data. This can be verified from graph 5.4. The 
network overhead contributes some losses and hence the bandwidth occupied is not equal 
to the blue traffic rate. 
Graph 5.4: Effective Bandwidth of Blue in abse
The equation is pessimistic and gives an upper bound on the amount of attack traffic that 
is required to cause a DDoS attack. It is difficult to estimate a lower bound on the amount 
of attack traffic needed as it is dependent on the unde
software and is thus difficult to estimate. 
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 Similar simulations were performed for two other configurations which were 
generated randomly by Python. The equation was found to be pessimistic for these 
configurations as well.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE COUNTERMEASURES 
 
This chapter presents some of the mechanisms provided to defend against Distributed 
Denial of Service Attacks. 
6.1 Defense Mechanisms 
DDoS defense may be regarded as a resource allocation problem in which the 
server resources are fairly allocated to clients to prevent attackers from consuming an 
excessive amount of resources. DDoS attacks can also be thwarted by filtering or rate 
limiting attack packets. An attack detection module is used to extract the characteristics 
of the attack packets and once the characteristics have been summarized, packet filtering 
modules are used to filter malicious packets. [40] 
 Some detection techniques use attack source traceback and identification as a 
response to a DDoS attack. The routers record information about the packets they have 
seen for later traceback requests or they send additional information about the packets 
they have seen to the packet’s destination. However, traceback is ineffective in DDoS 
attacks in which the attack traffic comes from legitimate sources. [41] 
 Activity profiling monitors the average packet rate for a network flow, which 
consists of consecutive packets with similar packet fields. The total network can be 
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measured as the sum over the average packets rates of all inbound and outbound flows. 
An attack can be detected if an increase is observed in the network flows. [42] 
 In the backscatter analysis, the researchers monitor a wide IP address space for 
incoming backscatter packets. The backscatter packet’s source address is that of the 
victim, but the packet’s destination address is randomly spoofed. An attack that uses 
uniformly distributed address spoofing leads to a finite probability that any monitored 
address space will receive backscatter packets. The packets are clustered based on the 
unique victim source address. To detect attacks, the researchers analyze a cluster’s 
destination address distribution uniformity. [42] 
The authors in [26] classify the DDoS defense mechanisms as being reactive and 
preventive. In reactive measures, the attack sources are identified as early as possible and 
are prevented from executing further attacks. The countermeasures here may be attack 
specific, when the attack is consuming fewer resources than available.  The preventive 
measures focus on eliminating the possibility of performing a DDoS attack. This 
mechanism is not 100 % effective but does ensures a decrease in the frequency and 
strength of DDoS attacks by making a host resilient to the attacks which includes 
identifying loopholes in the system and eliminating the vulnerabilities or removing 
application bugs to prevent intrusions. [6]. 
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6.2 Differentiating between Flash events and DDoS 
Before concluding that a denial of service attack is under progress, it is necessary 
to identify and separate DoS attacks from flash events. If any attempt to undermine a 
website is considered to be a Denial of Service attack, then the preventive techniques 
might end up throttling the excess legitimate traffic. Work has been done in the past in 
this field. A flash event is defined as a sudden increase in traffic for a particular website. 
This results in a dramatic increase in server load putting severe strain on the network 
links leading to the server. The end result is considerable increase in packet loss and 
congestion.  
6.3 Summary of work done 
The authors in [11] set up a game between the attacker and multiple distributed 
applications of an enterprise. The attacker might not have sufficient resources to disrupt 
all the processes of an enterprise. It will try to maximize the number of processes it can 
disable. In reaction, an enterprise can shift to another configuration that has not been 
attacked. Both the players have to determine the best process to make a move in. Since 
the problem is P-Space complete, the authors analyze it using Combinatorial Game 
Theory and Thermographs. Reconfiguration strategies are provided for distributed 
applications using Thermostrat strategy.  
The work presents an example which consists of 3 distributed applications. The 
values of the distributed applications are known a priori. For determining the process in 
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which a move has to be made, the authors make use of the Thermostrat strategy. The 
strategy is explained in detail in Chapter 7.  Figure 6.1 shows the three distributed 
applications.  
 
                    
Figure 6.1(a) Configuration 1    Figure 6.1(b) Configuration 2 
 
 
Figure 6.1(c) Configuration 3  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
BANDWIDTH LIMITED COORDINATION OF GAMES 
We now consider what happens when an enterprise (Blue) attempts to maintain 
operations in spite of an adversary (Red) launching a DDoS attack. Blue has a set of 
networks it needs to coordinate. For example, it may have accounting, finance, 
administration, research and development, and manufacturing systems that must remain 
operational while competing for the same scarce resources. Blue has to maintain 
communications for these separate networks over bandwidth limited links. The aim of 
Red is to disrupt Blue’s communications. Due to limited bandwidth availability over the 
links, Blue needs to coordinate among its networks by sending only the most important 
information. Blue will be successful in achieving this depending on whether it is able to 
find the most important message that needs to be transmitted. It would be ideal if this 
could be done without requiring out-of-band coordination messages. 
 We model this problem using combinatorial game theory. We first explain some 
of the basic terms required to understand the concepts of game theory.  
7.1 Surreal Numbers 
The authors in [27] define surreal numbers as an extension of real numbers with a 
tangible concept of infinity and infinitesimals. They describe surreal numbers as a pair of 
sets (Left and Right) of previously created surreal numbers such that no member of the 
right set maybe less than or equal to any member of the left set. By definition Left wins 
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the game if the final score is greater than zero, or if the final score equals zero and it is 
Right’s turn to play when the game ends [28]. If every element of the left set is not less 
than every element of the Right set, then it results in an ill-formed surreal number, also 
called as a game. Every surreal number is a game, but not all games are surreal numbers.  
A combinatorial game involves two players – Left and Right. A game tree has a 
root node which represents the initial position. The root node has zero or more branches 
going downwards to the left (representing moves for the left player) and downwards to 
the right (representing moves for the right player). At each point, the player considers the 
options he has and chooses the one which will maximize his payoff value. Game trees 
can be typically represented as shown in equation (7.1). 
 1 2 1 2,{ , ,...... | , ...... }n mL L L R R R  (7.1) 
 The options for left are represented as …  and the options for right are 
options from … .  The equation has a numeric value if  
 :i j i jL R L R∀ ∀ <  (7.2) 
The value of a surreal number where equation (7.2) holds is the “simplest” number 
between the greatest L value (Lmax) and the smallest R value (Rmin) [29]. If equation 
(7.2) is not satisfied, then the number is ill formed and it is a game. 
 :i j i jL R L R∃ ∃ ≥  (7.3) 
62 
 
The value of the game then depends on the sequence of moves taken. Figure 7.1 shows a 
diagram of a game tree which can be represented by equation (7.4) 
 
{15,{25 |10}| 5}G = −
 (7.4) 
 
Figure 7.1 Game tree represented by G 
If Right plays first, then he has only one option to move and he ends up gaining 5 
points from the Left player. If Left makes the first move, then he has two options which 
are represented by two branches going down leftwards. He can either choose the first 
option and gain 15 points from Right or choose the second option and move to the game 
{25 | 10}. If he chooses the second option, then Right plays next and gives the Left player 
10 points. The Left player would prefer winning 25 points to 10 and hence if Left plays 
first, he would choose the first option. 
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7.2 Combinatorial Game Theory 
A combinatorial game involves two players – Left and Right. These are perfect 
information games in which all players know all the moves that have taken place. 
Combinatorial game theory does not study games of chance. In our example scenario, 
there are multiple networks which want to coordinate and communicate over the network 
links. The Blue player needs to prioritize data and send the most important information. 
This effectively translates into a Sum of Games problem, where the Blue player is 
engaged in multiple games with Red and the aim is to maximize the overall payoff 
function. This sum of games is represented by 
 
,
1
n
i i j
j
G G
=
=∑  (7.5) 
Yedwab proved the following theorems in [28] which state that 
Theorem 1: Calculating the value of the Sum of Games is NP-hard. 
Theorem 2: Finding the optimal sequence of moves for a Sum of Games problem is 
PSPACE complete.  
These theorems state that a truly optimal strategy for a sum of games is only 
found by an exhaustive search of alternatives which requires exponential time. Instead of 
finding the best possible solution, it is possible to find a solution within a constant offset 
of the optimal.  
64 
 
Mathematical studies have been carried out using game trees to analyze the 
strategies used for playing games and winning them.  We introduce a concept called 
thermographs which could be used for chilling the games and finding the optimal 
strategies for the sum of games. In order to understand thermographs, we first explain the 
concept of ‘temperature’ of a game. 
The temperature of a game signifies the variability of the game. It signifies the 
amount that stands to be gained by either player initiating a move. A game where a much 
(little) stands to be gained or lost is called as hot (cold). The variability of a game can be 
reduced if a tax t is imposed for making a move. This is also called as process of cooling. 
It is done by modifying the game.  
 { | }L Rt t tG G t G t= − +  (7.6) 
We use the concept of thermographs in calculating the value of a game. 
Thermographs are plotted on graphs in which the co-ordinate system used has the tax on 
the y-axis and the game value on the x-axis. The values on the x-axis are plotted in 
decreasing order to keep the Left player’s options to the left side of the graph.  As tax t 
increases, both sides reach a common value which is called as the ‘mean value’ of the 
game. The smallest tax needed to reach the game’s mean value is called as the 
temperature of the game.  
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7.3 Plotting thermographs 
The authors in [30] explain the procedure for plotting a thermograph. They start with 
Left and Right’s choices and recurse upwards. For example, Figure 7.2 shows the 
thermograph of {{5 | -5} | -20}.  The thermograph of {5 | -5} is first plotted by marking 
the Left and Right choices for t=0 on the horizontal axis and then plotting the game 
values as t increases until the Left and Right values converge [12]. Since the value on the 
right is already a number (-20), its thermograph is just a vertical mast.  
The next step is to plot the thermograph of {{5 | -5} | -20} using the thermograph of {5 
| -5}. After Left has moved to {5 | -5} it will be Right’s turn so -5 is the starting point on 
the left. The temperature of the freezing point of {5|-5} is 5. So the left edge of the 
thermograph starts at point (-5, 5). 
The game -20 has value -20 and freezing point t = 0. So the right edge of the 
thermograph starts at point (-20, 0). We recursively subtract a tax t from the left and add 
it to the right, until the two values converge. As shown in Figure 7.3, this gives us the 
freezing point (temperature) of 10 and a mean value of -10.  
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               Figure 7.2: Plot of {5|-5}                                  Figure 7.3: Plot of {{5|-5}|-20} 
7.4 Berlekamp’s Strategies 
Choosing a strategy to play the sum of games problem would help to make a 
decision. In [12], Berlekamp presented three strategies for deciding which game to play 
in.  
Sentestrat: This strategy tells us to respond to the opponent’s move by making a move in 
the same game. This strategy is not of any importance for the work in this thesis, as we 
do not have an idea of where the opponent is. 
Thermostrat: In this strategy, by plotting the friendly side and the enemy side of the sum 
of games, we find the component game whose thermograph has the maximum width at 
different temperatures. The temperature at which the widest component occurs is called 
the ambient temperature. According to the Thermostrat strategy, the component game 
widest at the ambient temperature is the game that needs to be played in.  
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For example, in figure 7.4, there are three games being played simultaneously. G1 
= {{15|5}|{4|3}}, G2 = {30|20}, G3 = {{50|45}|75/2}. The thermographs for the games 
are shown from left to right. The left hand side is the sum of the left hand sides of the G1, 
G2, and G3 thermographs; that is 80 = 45 + 30 + 5. The right hand side is found by 
subtracting the maximum width of the three thermographs at each temperature. We note 
that the furthest right point of this graphic has value 69, which occurs at temperature 3/2. 
Since the thermograph of G2 has the maximum width at this temperature, Thermostrat 
advises to play in G2.  
 
Figure 7.4: Thermostrat strategy example. From right, Thermograph of G1, thermograph 
of G2, thermograph of G3, and thermograph evaluation of the sum of these three games 
In our work, we are playing in a game with one of the components masked. In such cases, 
the unmasked game might have extreme values or a single surreal number which could 
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drastically change the width and accordingly the decisions of playing in a game. Thus the 
Thermostrat strategy fails to be applicable in the work pertinent to this thesis. 
Hotstrat: Hotstrat strategy recommends play in a game which has the highest 
temperature. In other words, the Hotstrat strategy when applied to a sum of games 
problem would choose a game with the highest variability. Since the variability directly 
relates to the payoff values, this strategy correctly reflects the most important component 
game.  
The Hotstrat strategy [30] when applied to a sum of games problem would choose 
a game with the highest temperature and will correspondingly choose that game. Since 
the temperature of the game signifies the importance and variability of the game, the 
higher the variability of the game, the higher is the payoff that can be obtained by playing 
that game. In this example scenario, the result would give us the most important message 
that needs to be transmitted. This ensures that communication is maintained till the 
affected links are restored back to their normal state.   
7.5 Example Game 
We have multiple departments which need to coordinate in order to maintain 
communication. If the links between the departments experience a DDoS attack, there 
would be a heavy constraint on the bandwidth that can be assigned to the players. This 
limits the number of messages that could be transmitted. At such times, it would be of 
paramount importance to prioritize the messages that need to be sent. We model this as a 
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two player game with the two players being Red and Blue.  The aim of the Blue player is 
to maintain communication within its departments and the aim of the Red player is to try 
and disrupt it. If the attacker is able to disrupt the communication between the 
departments then the Red player wins.  
Multiple departments share a limited communications channel and more than one 
department can simultaneously detect changes in the network. The player needs to 
prioritize messages before deciding which is the most important. This problem was 
solved by Virtenen in [31] by considering Maximax, Maximin and central values 
prioritization schemes. We modify the problem to compare game trees instead of 
comparing range of values. We represent our set of messages as different branches of a 
game tree with payoff values assigned to each branch. In essence, m departments are 
simultaneously deciding which of the n attackers to engage (one attacker might target 
multiple links). Thus the message prioritization problem is changed from a team decision 
problem to a Sum of Games problem from combinatorial game theory.  
7.6 Playing in a game with one of the options masked 
Since more than one department can simultaneously detect changes in the 
network, a subset of the game changes, however because of bandwidth limitations, the 
players can not accurately know the details of all the games in the set. They need to 
choose the games which are more important. So the players end up playing in a sum of 
games problem where they are ignorant about the payoffs in a subset of the games. 
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7.7 Incorporating chance moves 
In order to deal with combinatorial game theory, we need to modify Conway’s 
surreal number approach to include chance moves. Surreal number representations of the 
game assume perfect information. Unfortunately, the underlying nature of this problem is 
probabilistic in nature. Figure 7.5 shows an extensive form representation of a chance 
move. Extensive form is a tree structure with each interior node of the tree representing a 
decision point. Leaves are associated with payoffs. At the root node, Blue wants to 
maximize the payoff. If Blue chooses the alternative on the left, two choices exist on the 
left with probability 0.4 and right with probability 0.6. After those chance moves are 
nodes that represent Red’s choices. Since Red wants to minimize, the left (right) node has 
value 5 (14). We state a theorem which helps us solve this problem. 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Extensive form representation of a chance move 
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Theorem 3. Given a probability distribution function {p1, p2, …pi} where pk is the 
probability of surreal number {Lk | Rk}, the expected value is a surreal number. 
Since addition and multiplication of well formed surreal numbers is a surreal number 
[27], for all elements in a game tree,  
 kp  surreal number = surreal number∗  (7.7) 
Blue uses the expected value of its left node 0.4 * 5 + 0.6 * 14 = 10.4 as its expected 
payoff in calculating which alternative to take. It can also be viewed as compressing the 
two Red moves into a single information set where Blue cannot know in advance which 
node in the information set it chooses. In extensive form, each player’s possible moves 
are expressed in alternation with chance moves inserted as necessary. By replacing 
chance moves in a game tree, we convert an imperfect information game into an 
equivalent perfect knowledge game. The next section talks about the algorithm to 
prioritize the messages.  
7.8 Message Prioritization Algorithm 
1. Each network monitors the state of its links. 
2. Each network constructs game trees based on the monitored data 
3. Surreal numbers are constructed for each engagement 
4. Thermographs are constructed from each surreal number and the freezing point is 
noted 
5. The data is prioritized using the temperature of its associated surreal number 
6. An alarm is set proportional to the inverse of the temperature.  
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7. As soon as the alarm expires, if the bandwidth is not occupied then data is 
transmitted. 
7.9 Simulation of Game Scenario 
The simulation game scenario developed using Python helps explain the example 
game. We also show that the Hotstrat strategy dominates the strategies used in [31] for 
game theory problems. 
Both the players – Red and Blue start the game with a common operating view. The 
common operating view is a set of three randomly generated games (G1, G2, G3). The 
two players compete by playing a sum of games problem on this set. On monitoring their 
links, the players determine that the games G2 and G3 are replaced by games G4 and G5. 
Since the players have bandwidth enough to transmit information of only one game, they 
have to choose between game G4 and G5. The decision about which player makes the 
first move is made randomly with both players having an equal probability. Both players 
are now playing a sum of games problem which consists of G1 G4 and G5. However, the 
players are forced to choose between the information sets of {G1, G2, G5} and {G1, G4, 
G3}. The players choose a strategy from Maximax, Maximin, Central values and Hotstrat 
to help them decide which game to play in and make a move in that game. This procedure 
is followed until payoff values are obtained for all three games. The payoff values 
corresponding to the real scenario are summed to give the payoff for the sum of games. If 
the sum is greater than or equal to half the maximum payoff possible, then Blue player 
wins, else Red wins.  
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The five randomly generated games are 
   	
12|32 | 
33|32     
48|9|
43|19    
   	
4|9 | 
49|34     
24|1|
9|4    
   	
6|37 | 
49|2     
10|34|
21|18    
   	
10|2 | 
4|45     
32|39|
32|34    
   	
15|5 | 
14|43     
13|27|
3|27    
The steps taken to choose the game which it prefers to see are listed in Table 7.1. The 
following conventions are used to describe the simulation example.  
S:  Set of games which the player sees and applies the strategy to.  
x:  Strategy chosen 
Ig:  Game which is inconsistent with the real scenario  
cg:  Game chosen to be modified after applying x  
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Time 
step 
Action performed by Blue Action performed by Red 
1 S = { G1, G2, G3} 
x = Maximax 
S = { G1, G2, G3} 
x = Maximax 
2 Apply x to G4 and G5 
Ig = G5 
S = { G1, G4, G3} 
Apply x to G4 and G5 
Ig = G5 
S = { G1, G4, G3} 
Table 7.1: Procedure to decide the starting scenario 
Table 7.2 details the steps followed after choosing the inconsistent game. In our 
simulation run, Blue player starts the game. 
Time 
step 
In 
action 
Scenario before S Action Scenario after S 
1 Blue G1 = {{12|32}|{33|32}|| 
{48|9}|{43|19}}  
G4 = {{10|2}|{4|45}|| 
{32|39}|{32|34}} 
G3 = {{6|37}|{49|2}|| 
{10|34}|{21|18}} 
 
Apply x to S 
cg = G3 
 
 
G1 = 
{{12|32}|{33|32}|| 
{48|9}|{43|19}} 
G4 = {{10|2}|{4|45}|| 
{32|39}|{32|34}} 
G3 = {6|37}|{49|2} 
 
  
75 
 
2 Red G1 = {{12|32}|{33|32}|| 
{48|9}|{43|19}}  
G4 = {{10|2}|{4|45}|| 
{32|39}|{32|34}} 
G3 = {6|37}|{49|2} 
 
Apply x to S 
cg = G4 
G1 = 
{{12|32}|{33|32}|| 
{48|9}|{43|19}}  
G4 = {32|39}|{32|34} 
G3 = {6|37}|{49|2} 
 
3 Blue G1 = {{12|32}|{33|32}|| 
{48|9}|{43|19}}  
G4 = {32|39}|{32|34} 
G3 = {6|37}|{49|2} 
 
Apply x to S 
cg = G3 
G1 = 
{{12|32}|{33|32}|| 
{48|9}|{43|19}}  
G4 = {32|39}|{32|34} 
G3 = {6|37} 
 
4 Red G1= {{12|32}|{33|32}|| 
{48|9}|{43|19}}  
G4 = {32|39}|{32|34} 
G3= {6|37} 
 
Apply x to S 
cg = G3 
G1= 
{{12|32}|{33|32}|| 
{48|9}|{43|19}}  
G4 = {32|39}|{32|34} 
G3=  37 
 
Table 7.2: Steps to play the game 
At time step 4, a final payoff value is obtained for G3. The procedure is continued until 
payoff values are obtained for all the games. Since the payoff values corresponding to the 
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real scenario are considered, the payoff value in this case is the summation of the payoff 
values for games G1 G4  and G5 which is 69 (32 for G1 + 32 for G4 + 5 for G5). 
The simulations are run 500 times for each pair of strategies. The percentage wins for 
Blue player are recorded. The rows represent the strategies chosen by Blue and the 
columns represent to strategies chosen by Red. 
 Maximax Maximin Central Values Hotstrat 
Maximax 0.53 0.518 0.55 0.27 
Maximin 0.492 0.548 0.488 0.354 
Central Values 0.564 0.538 0.534 0.362 
Hotstrat 0.75 0.71 0.718 0.542 
Table 7.3: Recorded percentage wins for Blue 
The test for statistical significance between binomial distributions [7] is used to verify 
that the values in Table 7.3 are significantly different. 
 
1 2
2 1
(1 )log 0.41(1 )
p p
p p
 −
< 
− 
 (7.8) 
Row wise and column wise comparisons are performed to determine the most optimal 
strategy for Red and Blue.  
For a Red strategy, the most optimal strategy for Blue can be determined by comparing 
values within columns. This is shown in Table 7.4. Sub columns are created within 
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columns to show which strategies are being compared. We note that Hotstrat’s 
performance is significantly better than the other three, no matter which strategy was 
chosen by Red. So Hotstrat is marked as a + and the others are marked as -. When there is 
no significant difference between the strategies, then they are marked as ≈. 
On comparing within rows, we obtain the strategy that performs best for Red against a 
given Blue strategy. Similarly, Hotstrat causes Blue to win fewer games than other 
strategies. This is shown in Table 7.5.  Thus the Hotstrat provides an effective strategy 
for determining the priority of the games when competing for bandwidth.  
 Maximax Maximin Central 
Values 
Hotstrat 
Maximax - ≈ - ≈ - ≈ -  - ≈ 
Maximin - ≈ - ≈ - ≈ - ≈  ≈ 
Central Values - ≈ - ≈ - ≈ - ≈ +  
Hotstrat +  +  +  +    
Table 7.4: Choosing an optimal strategy for Blue 
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 Maximax Maximin 
Central 
Values 
Hotstrat 
Maximax 
+ + + - 
≈ ≈ ≈  
Maximin 
+ + + - 
≈ ≈ ≈  
Central Values 
+ + + - 
≈ ≈ ≈  
Hotstrat 
+ + + - 
≈ ≈ ≈  
Table 7.5: Choosing an optimal strategy for Red 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY 
We verified, by performing simulations, the work in [11] to quantify the number 
of resources that an attacker would need to disable a network. Performing a DDoS on a 
large scale network is more reasonable than a DDoS on a small scale network. We choose 
the SSFNet simulator over its competitors as it is capable of handling large networks.  To 
simplify the tedious and error prone process of writing script for large networks, we 
automate the network generation process.  
The formula derived in [11] is developed for an ideal network. It does not account 
for processing and the overhead contributed by the network. Since the network simulator 
is not really the actual network, the statistics obtained give an upper bound of the amount 
of attack traffic required to cause a DDoS. It is slightly conservative in quantifying the 
zombie traffic.  The lower bound is dependent on the underlying network implementation 
and we suspect that a better estimate would have to be empirical. However, considering 
the fact that we cannot ethically perform a DDoS on a functioning network, it is unlikely 
that further empirical work can be done.  
In Chapter 7, we develop an alternative application of combinatorial game theory 
in which we allocate bandwidth between processes. We present an example scenario by 
setting up a game between an attacker and multiple distributed applications of an 
enterprise. The enterprise coordinates between its different networks by maintaining 
communication over bandwidth communication links. The limited bandwidth links make 
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it necessary to determine the most important message that an enterprise needs to transmit.  
In order to account for the probabilistic nature of the problem, we convert a game with 
imperfect information into perfect information games. We compare four strategies – 
Maximin, Maximax, Central value and Hotstrat to determine the priority of the messages 
and conclude that Hotstrat gives us the best possible results. We verify our understanding 
by running simulations. The results indicate that our proposed technique will be part of 
an effective DDoS countermeasure.  
Further research can be focused on 
1. Introducing background traffic 
2. Simulating with a protocol that performs load balancing and more closely 
simulates the working of the Internet.  
3. Implementing a prototype of the Bandwidth Limited coordination of 
games 
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APPENDIX A – DML SCRIPT OF 3 NETWORKS 
 
#Starting to write the dml file 
schema [_find .schemas.Net] 
 
Network1 [ 
Net [ 
 router[ 
 id 0 
 interface [id 0 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 1 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 2 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 3 bitrate 9000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 4 bitrate 4000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 
 _find .dictionary.routerGraphFlowMonitored.graph 
 
 ] #end of the router loop 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard client declaration 
 host[id 1  
  _extends .dictionary.standardClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(0)] 
 ] #end of udp standard client 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard server declaration 
 host[id 2  
  _extends .dictionary.standardServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(1)] 
 ] #end of host2 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack client declaration 
 host[id 3  
  _extends .dictionary.attackClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(2)] 
 ] #end of udp attack client 
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 # starting of udp attack server declaration 
 host[id 4  
  _extends .dictionary.attackServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(3)] 
 ] #end of host4 
 
  link [attach 0(0) attach 1(0)]  
  link [attach 0(1) attach 2(0)] 
 
  link [attach 0(2) attach 3(0)]  
  link [attach 0(3) attach 4(0)] 
 
 graphics [  
  collapsed false  
  render [  
   net [  
  expanded [  
  ]  
  ]  
  ]  
 x 100.0  
 y 100.0  
 transform [  
  affine 0.66,0.0,0.0,0.66,-300.0,-400.0  
 ]  
 ] 
 
] #end of the Net loop 
] #end of Network loop 
 
 
Network2 [ 
Net [ 
 router[ 
 id 0 
 interface [id 0 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 1 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 2 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 3 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 4 bitrate 4000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 interface [id 5 bitrate 8000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
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  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 
 _find .dictionary.routerGraphFlowMonitored.graph 
 
 ] #end of the router loop 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard client declaration 
 host[id 1  
  _extends .dictionary.standardClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(0)] 
 ] #end of udp standard client 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard server declaration 
 host[id 2  
  _extends .dictionary.standardServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(1)] 
 ] #end of host2 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack client declaration 
 host[id 3  
  _extends .dictionary.attackClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(2)] 
 ] #end of udp attack client 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack server declaration 
 host[id 4  
  _extends .dictionary.attackServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(3)] 
 ] #end of host4 
 
  link [attach 0(0) attach 1(0)]  
  link [attach 0(1) attach 2(0)] 
 
  link [attach 0(2) attach 3(0)]  
  link [attach 0(3) attach 4(0)] 
 
 graphics [  
  collapsed false  
  render [  
   net [  
  expanded [  
  ]  
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  ]  
  ]  
 x 100.0  
 y 100.0  
 transform [  
  affine 0.66,0.0,0.0,0.66,-300.0,-400.0  
 ]  
 ] 
 
] #end of the Net loop 
] #end of Network loop 
 
 
Network3 [ 
Net [ 
 router[ 
 id 0 
 interface [id 0 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 1 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 2 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 3 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 5 bitrate 8000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 
 
 _find .dictionary.routerGraphFlowMonitored.graph 
 
 ] #end of the router loop 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard client declaration 
 host[id 1  
  _extends .dictionary.standardClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(0)] 
 ] #end of udp standard client 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard server declaration 
 host[id 2  
  _extends .dictionary.standardServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(1)] 
 ] #end of host2 
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 # starting of udp attack client declaration 
 host[id 3  
  _extends .dictionary.attackClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(2)] 
 ] #end of udp attack client 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack server declaration 
 host[id 4  
  _extends .dictionary.attackServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(3)] 
 ] #end of host4 
 
  link [attach 0(0) attach 1(0)]  
  link [attach 0(1) attach 2(0)] 
 
  link [attach 0(2) attach 3(0)]  
  link [attach 0(3) attach 4(0)] 
 
 graphics [  
  collapsed false  
  render [  
   net [  
  expanded [  
  ]  
  ]  
  ]  
 x 100.0  
 y 100.0  
 transform [  
  affine 0.66,0.0,0.0,0.66,-300.0,-400.0  
 ]  
 ] 
 
] #end of the Net loop 
] #end of Network loop 
 
 
 
Net [ 
 frequency 1000000000000000  
  AS_status boundary  
  ospf_area 0 
 
 #random number generation  
 randomstream [  
 generator "MersenneTwister"  
 stream DefaultStream  
 ] 
 
 
 Net [id 1 _extends .Network1.Net] 
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 Net [id 2 _extends .Network2.Net] 
 
 Net [id 3 _extends .Network3.Net] 
 
 
link [attach 1:0(4) attach 2:0(4) delay 0.0] 
 
link [attach 2:0(5) attach 3:0(5) delay 0.0] 
 
traffic [ 
 pattern [  
  client 3:1  
  servers [port 10 nhi 1:2(0)]  
 ]   
 
 pattern [  
  client 3:3  
  servers [port 10 nhi 1:4(0)]  
 ]   
 
] 
 
] #Net loop closes 
 
dictionary[ 
 
 standardClient [ 
  interface [id 0 _extends .dictionary.10BaseT]  
  route [dest default interface 0] 
  graph [  
  ProtocolSession [  
   name client use SSF.OS.UDP.test.udpStreamClient  
   start_time 30.0  
   start_window 0.0  
   file_size 3000000  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.request_size  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.datagram_size  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.show_report  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.debug  
  ] 
  ProtocolSession [name socket use 
SSF.OS.Socket.socketMaster]  
  ProtocolSession [name udp use SSF.OS.UDP.udpSessionMaster  
   _find .dictionary.udpinit]  
  ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP]  
  ]  
 ] 
 
 attackClient [ 
  interface [id 0 _extends .dictionary.10BaseT]  
  route [dest default interface 0]  
  graph [  
   ProtocolSession [  
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  name client use SSF.OS.UDP.test.udpStreamClient  
  start_time 30.0  
  start_window 0.0  
  file_size 3000000 
  _find .dictionary.appsession.request_size  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.datagram_size  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.show_report  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.debug  
  ]  
   ProtocolSession [name socket use SSF.OS.Socket.socketMaster]  
   ProtocolSession [name udp use SSF.OS.UDP.udpSessionMaster  
    _find .dictionary.udpinit]  
   ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP]  
  ]  
 ] 
 
 10BaseT [  
  bitrate 4000000  
  latency 0.0  
 ] 
 
 10BaseTBT [ 
  bitrate 8000000 
  latency 0.0 
 ] 
 
 10BaseTRT [ 
  bitrate 9000000 
  latency 0.0 
 ] 
 
 udpinit [  
  max_datagram_size 100000  
  debug false  
 ] 
 
 standardServer [  
   interface [id 0 _extends .dictionary.10BaseTBT]  
   route [dest default interface 0]  
   graph [  
   ProtocolSession [  
    name server use SSF.OS.UDP.test.udpStreamServer  
    port 10  
    client_limit 10  
    _find .dictionary.appsession.request_size  
    _find .dictionary.appsession.datagram_size  
    _find .dictionary.appsession.send_interval  
    _find .dictionary.appsession.show_report  
    _find .dictionary.appsession.debug  
   ]  
   ProtocolSession [name socket use 
SSF.OS.Socket.socketMaster]  
   ProtocolSession [name udp use 
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SSF.OS.UDP.udpSessionMaster  
    _find .dictionary.udpinit]  
   ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP]  
   ]  
  ] 
 
 attackServer [  
  interface [id 0 _extends .dictionary.10BaseTRT]  
  route [dest default interface 0 ]  
  graph [  
  ProtocolSession [  
   name server use SSF.OS.UDP.test.udpStreamServer  
   port 10  
   client_limit 10  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.request_size  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.datagram_size  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.send_attk_interval  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.show_report  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.debug  
   ]  
  ProtocolSession [name socket use 
SSF.OS.Socket.socketMaster]  
  ProtocolSession [name udp use SSF.OS.UDP.udpSessionMaster  
   _find .dictionary.udpinit]  
  ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP]  
  ]  
 ] 
 
 hostLANinterfaceMonitored [interface [id 0 _extends 
.dictionary.100Gb  
 _find .dictionary.queueMonitor.monitor  
 ]] 
 
 100Gb [  
 bitrate 900000000  
 latency 0.0  
 ] 
 
 baseRouterGraph [  
 ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP]  
#changed ospf version 
 ProtocolSession [name ospf use SSF.OS.OSPF.sOSPF]  
 ] 
 
 routerGraphFlowMonitored [graph [  
 _extends .dictionary.baseRouterGraph  
 ProtocolSession [  
  name ip use SSF.OS.IP  
  monitor [  
  name ipnetflow use SSF.OS.NetFlow.IpFlowCollector  
  protocol_type all  
  max_inactive_time 10  
  max_flow_time 100000  
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  ]  
 ]  
 ProtocolSession [  
 name probe use SSF.OS.ProbeSession  
 file "sampada.dat"  
 stream netflow  
 ]  
 ]] 
 
 baseServerGraph [  
 ProtocolSession [  
  name server use SSF.OS.TCP.test.tcpServer  
  port 10  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.request_size  
  _find .dicitonary.appsession.show_report  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.debug  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.qlimit  
 ]  
 ProtocolSession [name socket use SSF.OS.Socket.socketMaster]  
 ProtocolSession [name tcp use SSF.OS.TCP.tcpSessionMaster  
  _find .dicitonary.tcpinit]  
 ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP  
 monitor [  
 use SSF.App.DDoS.RequestsMonitor  
 probe_interval 100.0  
 debug true  
 ]  
 ]] 
 
 serverGraphNICMonitored [graph [  
 _extends .dictionary.baseServerGraph  
 ProtocolSession [  
  name probe use SSF.OS.ProbeSession  
  file "sampada.dat"  
  stream netflow  
 ]  
 ]] 
 
 #TCP initial parameters  
 tcpinit[  
 ISS 10000  
 MSS 1000  
 RcvWndSize 32  
 SendWndSize 32  
 SendBufferSize 128  
 MaxRexmitTimes 12  
 TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL 0.5  
 TCP_FAST_INTERVAL 0.2  
 MSL 60.0  
 MaxIdleTime 600.0  
 delayed_ack false  
 fast_recovery false  
 show_report true  
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 ] 
 
 queueMonitor [monitor [  
 use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
 probe_interval 0.1  
 protocol_type udp  
 debug true  
 ]] 
 
 appsession [  
 request_size 500  
 datagram_size 1000  
 send_attk_interval 0.00088888 
 send_interval 0.001 
 qlimit 5000  
 show_report true  
 debug true  
 ] 
] #dictionary loop closes 
 
graphics [  
render [ ]  
transform [  
 affine 1.0,0.0,0.0,1.0,495.0,396.0  
]  
]  
background "197,246,251(T):126,235,246(B)"  
width 600 height 600 
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APPENDIX B – DML SCRIPT OF 5 NETWORKS 
#Starting to write the dml file 
schema [_find .schemas.Net] 
 
Network1 [ 
Net [ 
 router[ 
 id 0 
 interface [id 0 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 1 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 2 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 3 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 4 bitrate 4000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 
 interface [id 5 bitrate 4000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 
 interface [id 6 bitrate 5000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 
 _find .dictionary.routerGraphFlowMonitored.graph 
 
 ] #end of the router loop 
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 # starting of udp standard client declaration 
 host[id 1  
  _extends .dictionary.standardClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(0)] 
 ] #end of udp standard client 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard server declaration 
 host[id 2  
  _extends .dictionary.standardServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(1)] 
 ] #end of host2 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack client declaration 
 host[id 3  
  _extends .dictionary.attackClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(2)] 
 ] #end of udp attack client 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack server declaration 
 host[id 4  
  _extends .dictionary.attackServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(3)] 
 ] #end of host4 
 
  link [attach 0(0) attach 1(0)]  
  link [attach 0(1) attach 2(0)] 
 
  link [attach 0(2) attach 3(0)]  
  link [attach 0(3) attach 4(0)] 
 
 graphics [  
  collapsed false  
  render [  
   net [  
  expanded [  
  ]  
  ]  
  ]  
 x 100.0  
 y 100.0  
 transform [  
  affine 0.66,0.0,0.0,0.66,-300.0,-400.0  
 ]  
 ] 
 
] #end of the Net loop 
] #end of Network loop 
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Network2 [ 
Net [ 
 router[ 
 id 0 
 interface [id 0 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 1 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 2 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 3 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 4 bitrate 4000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 interface [id 5 bitrate 8000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 
 _find .dictionary.routerGraphFlowMonitored.graph 
 
 ] #end of the router loop 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard client declaration 
 host[id 1  
  _extends .dictionary.standardClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(0)] 
 ] #end of udp standard client 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard server declaration 
 host[id 2  
  _extends .dictionary.standardServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(1)] 
 ] #end of host2 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack client declaration 
 host[id 3  
  _extends .dictionary.attackClient 
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  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(2)] 
 ] #end of udp attack client 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack server declaration 
 host[id 4  
  _extends .dictionary.attackServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(3)] 
 ] #end of host4 
 
  link [attach 0(0) attach 1(0)]  
  link [attach 0(1) attach 2(0)] 
 
  link [attach 0(2) attach 3(0)]  
  link [attach 0(3) attach 4(0)] 
 
 graphics [  
  collapsed false  
  render [  
   net [  
  expanded [  
  ]  
  ]  
  ]  
 x 100.0  
 y 100.0  
 transform [  
  affine 0.66,0.0,0.0,0.66,-300.0,-400.0  
 ]  
 ] 
 
] #end of the Net loop 
] #end of Network loop 
 
 
Network3 [ 
Net [ 
 router[ 
 id 0 
 interface [id 0 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 1 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 2 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 3 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 5 bitrate 8000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
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 ] #end of interface 
 
 
 _find .dictionary.routerGraphFlowMonitored.graph 
 
 ] #end of the router loop 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard client declaration 
 host[id 1  
  _extends .dictionary.standardClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(0)] 
 ] #end of udp standard client 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard server declaration 
 host[id 2  
  _extends .dictionary.standardServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(1)] 
 ] #end of host2 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack client declaration 
 host[id 3  
  _extends .dictionary.attackClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(2)] 
 ] #end of udp attack client 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack server declaration 
 host[id 4  
  _extends .dictionary.attackServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(3)] 
 ] #end of host4 
 
  link [attach 0(0) attach 1(0)]  
  link [attach 0(1) attach 2(0)] 
 
  link [attach 0(2) attach 3(0)]  
  link [attach 0(3) attach 4(0)] 
 
 graphics [  
  collapsed false  
  render [  
   net [  
  expanded [  
  ]  
  ]  
  ]  
 x 100.0  
 y 100.0  
 transform [  
  affine 0.66,0.0,0.0,0.66,-300.0,-400.0  
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 ]  
 ] 
 
] #end of the Net loop 
] #end of Network loop 
 
Network4 [ 
Net [ 
 router[ 
 id 0 
 interface [id 0 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 1 bitrate 4000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 2 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 3 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 5 bitrate 4000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 
 _find .dictionary.routerGraphFlowMonitored.graph 
 
 ] #end of the router loop 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard client declaration 
 host[id 1  
  _extends .dictionary.standardClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(0)] 
 ] #end of udp standard client 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard server declaration 
 host[id 2  
  _extends .dictionary.standardServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(1)] 
 ] #end of host2 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack client declaration 
 host[id 3  
  _extends .dictionary.attackClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(2)] 
 ] #end of udp attack client 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack server declaration 
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 host[id 4  
  _extends .dictionary.attackServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(3)] 
 ] #end of host4 
 
  link [attach 0(0) attach 1(0)]  
  link [attach 0(1) attach 2(0)] 
 
  link [attach 0(2) attach 3(0)]  
  link [attach 0(3) attach 4(0)] 
 
 graphics [  
  collapsed false  
  render [  
   net [  
  expanded [  
  ]  
  ]  
  ]  
 x 100.0  
 y 100.0  
 transform [  
  affine 0.66,0.0,0.0,0.66,-300.0,-400.0  
 ]  
 ] 
 
] #end of the Net loop 
] #end of Network loop 
 
Network5 [ 
Net [ 
 router[ 
 id 0 
 interface [id 0 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 1 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 2 bitrate 8000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 3 bitrate 5000000 latency 0.0] 
 interface [id 6 bitrate 5000000.0 latency 0.0 
  queue [  
  use  SSF.Net.droptailQueue  
  ]  
  monitor[  
  use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
  probe_interval 0.1  
  debug true 
  ] 
 buffer 10000  
 ] #end of interface 
 
 _find .dictionary.routerGraphFlowMonitored.graph 
 
 ] #end of the router loop 
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 # starting of udp standard client declaration 
 host[id 1  
  _extends .dictionary.standardClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(0)] 
 ] #end of udp standard client 
 
 
 # starting of udp standard server declaration 
 host[id 2  
  _extends .dictionary.standardServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(1)] 
 ] #end of host2 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack client declaration 
 host[id 3  
  _extends .dictionary.attackClient 
  nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(2)] 
 ] #end of udp attack client 
 
 
 # starting of udp attack server declaration 
 host[id 4  
  _extends .dictionary.attackServer 
 nhi_route [dest default interface 0 next_hop 0(3)] 
 ] #end of host4 
 
  link [attach 0(0) attach 1(0)]  
  link [attach 0(1) attach 2(0)] 
 
  link [attach 0(2) attach 3(0)]  
  link [attach 0(3) attach 4(0)] 
 
 graphics [  
  collapsed false  
  render [  
   net [  
  expanded [  
  ]  
  ]  
  ]  
 x 100.0  
 y 100.0  
 transform [  
  affine 0.66,0.0,0.0,0.66,-300.0,-400.0  
 ]  
 ] 
 
] #end of the Net loop 
] #end of Network loop 
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Net [ 
 frequency 1000000000000000  
  AS_status boundary  
  ospf_area 0 
 
 #random number generation  
 randomstream [  
 generator "MersenneTwister"  
 stream DefaultStream  
 ] 
 
 
 Net [id 1 _extends .Network1.Net] 
 
 Net [id 2 _extends .Network2.Net] 
 
 Net [id 3 _extends .Network3.Net] 
 
 Net [id 4 _extends .Network4.Net] 
 
 Net [id 5 _extends .Network5.Net] 
 
 
  
link [attach 1:0(4) attach 2:0(4) delay 0.0] 
 
link [attach 2:0(5) attach 3:0(5) delay 0.0] 
 
link [attach 4:0(5) attach 1:0(5) delay 0.0] 
 
link [attach 5:0(6) attach 1:0(6) delay 0.0] 
 
traffic [ 
 
 pattern [  
  client 3:3  
  servers [port 10 nhi 5:4(0)]  
 ]   
 
 pattern [  
  client 3:1  
  servers [port 10 nhi 4:2(0)]  
 ]   
 
] 
 
] #Net loop closes 
 
dictionary[ 
 
 standardClient [ 
  interface [id 0 _extends .dictionary.10BaseT]  
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  route [dest default interface 0] 
  graph [  
  ProtocolSession [  
   name client use SSF.OS.UDP.test.udpStreamClient  
   start_time 30.0  
   start_window 0.0  
   file_size 3000000  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.request_size  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.datagram_size  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.show_report  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.debug  
  ] 
  ProtocolSession [name socket use 
SSF.OS.Socket.socketMaster]  
  ProtocolSession [name udp use SSF.OS.UDP.udpSessionMaster  
   _find .dictionary.udpinit]  
  ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP]  
  ]  
 ] 
 
 attackClient [ 
  interface [id 0 _extends .dictionary.10BaseT]  
  route [dest default interface 0]  
  graph [  
   ProtocolSession [  
  name client use SSF.OS.UDP.test.udpStreamClient  
  start_time 30.0  
  start_window 0.0  
  file_size 3000000 
  _find .dictionary.appsession.request_size  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.datagram_size  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.show_report  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.debug  
  ]  
   ProtocolSession [name socket use SSF.OS.Socket.socketMaster]  
   ProtocolSession [name udp use SSF.OS.UDP.udpSessionMaster  
    _find .dictionary.udpinit]  
   ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP]  
  ]  
 ] 
 
 10BaseT [  
  bitrate 8000000  
  latency 0.0  
 ] 
 
 10BaseTRT [ 
  bitrate 5000000 
  latency 0.0 
 ] 
 
 10BaseTBT [ 
  bitrate 4000000 
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  latency 0.0 
 ] 
 
  
  udpinit [  
  max_datagram_size 100000  
  debug false  
 ] 
 
 standardServer [  
   interface [id 0 _extends .dictionary.10BaseTBT]  
   route [dest default interface 0]  
   graph [  
   ProtocolSession [  
    name server use SSF.OS.UDP.test.udpStreamServer  
    port 10  
    client_limit 10  
    _find .dictionary.appsession.request_size  
    _find .dictionary.appsession.datagram_size  
    _find .dictionary.appsession.send_interval  
    _find .dictionary.appsession.show_report  
    _find .dictionary.appsession.debug  
   ]  
   ProtocolSession [name socket use 
SSF.OS.Socket.socketMaster]  
   ProtocolSession [name udp use 
SSF.OS.UDP.udpSessionMaster  
    _find .dictionary.udpinit]  
   ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP]  
   ]  
  ] 
 
 attackServer [  
  interface [id 0 _extends .dictionary.10BaseTRT]  
  route [dest default interface 0 ]  
  graph [  
  ProtocolSession [  
   name server use SSF.OS.UDP.test.udpStreamServer  
   port 10  
   client_limit 10  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.request_size  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.datagram_size  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.send_attk_interval  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.show_report  
   _find .dictionary.appsession.debug  
   ]  
  ProtocolSession [name socket use 
SSF.OS.Socket.socketMaster]  
  ProtocolSession [name udp use SSF.OS.UDP.udpSessionMaster  
   _find .dictionary.udpinit]  
  ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP]  
  ]  
 ] 
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 hostLANinterfaceMonitored [interface [id 0 _extends 
.dictionary.100Gb  
 _find .dictionary.queueMonitor.monitor  
 ]] 
 
 100Gb [  
 bitrate 900000000  
 latency 0.0  
 ] 
 
 baseRouterGraph [  
 ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP]  
 ProtocolSession [name ospf use SSF.OS.OSPF.sOSPF]  
 ] 
 
 routerGraphFlowMonitored [graph [  
 _extends .dictionary.baseRouterGraph  
 ProtocolSession [  
  name ip use SSF.OS.IP  
  monitor [  
  name ipnetflow use SSF.OS.NetFlow.IpFlowCollector  
  protocol_type all  
  max_inactive_time 10  
  max_flow_time 100000  
  ]  
 ]  
 ProtocolSession [  
 name probe use SSF.OS.ProbeSession  
 file "sampada.dat"  
 stream netflow  
 ]  
 ]] 
 
 baseServerGraph [  
 ProtocolSession [  
  name server use SSF.OS.TCP.test.tcpServer  
  port 10  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.request_size  
  _find .dicitonary.appsession.show_report  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.debug  
  _find .dictionary.appsession.qlimit  
 ]  
 ProtocolSession [name socket use SSF.OS.Socket.socketMaster]  
 ProtocolSession [name tcp use SSF.OS.TCP.tcpSessionMaster  
  _find .dicitonary.tcpinit]  
 ProtocolSession [name ip use SSF.OS.IP  
 monitor [  
 use SSF.App.DDoS.RequestsMonitor  
 probe_interval 100.0  
 debug true  
 ]  
 ]] 
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 serverGraphNICMonitored [graph [  
 _extends .dictionary.baseServerGraph  
 ProtocolSession [  
  name probe use SSF.OS.ProbeSession  
  file "sampada.dat"  
  stream netflow  
 ]  
 ]] 
 
 #TCP initial parameters  
 tcpinit[  
 ISS 10000  
 MSS 1000  
 RcvWndSize 32  
 SendWndSize 32  
 SendBufferSize 128  
 MaxRexmitTimes 12  
 TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL 0.5  
 TCP_FAST_INTERVAL 0.2  
 MSL 60.0  
 MaxIdleTime 600.0  
 delayed_ack false  
 fast_recovery false  
 show_report true  
 ] 
 
 queueMonitor [monitor [  
 use SSF.Net.droptailQueueMonitor_1  
 probe_interval 0.1  
 protocol_type udp  
 debug true  
 ]] 
 
 appsession [  
 request_size 500  
 datagram_size 1000  
 send_attk_interval 0.0016 
 send_interval 0.002 
 qlimit 5000  
 show_report true  
 debug true  
 ] 
] #dictionary loop closes 
 
graphics [  
render [ ]  
transform [  
 affine 1.0,0.0,0.0,1.0,495.0,396.0  
]  
]  
background "197,246,251(T):126,235,246(B)"  
width 600 height 600 
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APPENDIX C – SIMULATION ISSUES 
 
Some of the issues with the SSFNet simulator that were encountered while gathering 
results are listed below.  
1. Lack of adaptive routing: SSF.OS.OSPF is a partial implementation of OSPFv2, 
based on the Internet Engineering Task Force’s Request for Comments number 
2328 (RFC 2328). It is designed to quickly compute the routing tables for 
arbitrary topologies in SSFNet network models. The unsupported requirements 
include dynamic neighbor discovery and link state updates in response to dynamic 
topology changes. We use this OSPF version in our simulations. This does not 
reflect the way the Internet works in reality. Future research could include 
implementation of protocols that accurately simulate the working of the Internet. 
 
 
 Figure: Glitch observed when Blue 
2. As shown in the figure above, a glitch is observed at a specific network traffic 
level when the rate at which blue server generates data is equal to the rate at 
which red server generates data. The bandwidth allocated t
unexpectedly whereas the bandwidth allocated to Red is significantly less. This 
behavior is observed for all the mincut arcs of all the configurations. We believe 
this to be an artifact of the simulator. The simulator fails to behave as expec
this point.  
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